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PREFACE 
T h i s  paper  i s  concernea  w i t h  heavy v i a b l e  t r a j e c t o r i e s  of a c o n t r o l l e d  
sys tem w i t h  feedbacks  and t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  a  dynamical  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  
a l l o c a t i o n  mechanism i n  an  exchange economy. 
I n  t h i s  framework, t h e  c o n t r o l s  a r e  t h e  p r i c e s  w h i l e  t h e  s t a t e s  of  
t h e  sys tem a r e  t h e  consumpt2on l e v e l s  of t h e  consumers. The consumption of  
each  consumer e v o l v e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  
p r i c e .  V i a b l e  t r a j e c t o r i e s  a r e  t h o s e  which obey t h e  s c a r c i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s :  
t h e  t o t a l  consumpt ionmus t  remain w i t h i n  t h e  s e t  of  a v a i l a b l e  commodities. 
The d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n  y i e l d i n g  heavy v i a b l e  t r a j e c t o r i e s  i s . c o n s t r u r t e d ; .  
p r o v i d i n g  a  model of  how t h e  marke t  may govern t h e  e v o l u t i o n  of  p r i c e s .  
T h i s  r e s e a r c h  was conducted w i t h i n  t h e  framework of  t h e  Dynamics o f  
Macrosystems s t u d y  i n  t h e  System and D e c i s i o n  S c i e n c e s  Program. 
ANDRZEJ WIERZBICKI 
Chairman 
System and Dec i s ion  S c i e n c e s  
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Abstract 
We define and study the concept of heavy viable trajectories of a controlled system 
with feedbacks in the framework a dynamical decentralized allocation mechanism in 
an exchange economy. 
In this framework, the controls are the prices and the states of the system the 
consumptions of the consumers. Consumptions of each consumer evolve according a 
differential equation controlled by the price. Viable trajectories are the ones 
which obey the scarcity constraints : the sum of the consumptions must remain in 
the set of available commodities. Prices regulating viable trajectories evolve 
according a set-valued feedback map. Heavy viable trajectories are the ones 
associated to prices in the feedback map which evolve as slowly as possible : 
at each instant, the norm of the velocity of the price is minimal among the prices 
regulating a viable trajector-4. 
In this report , we construct the differential equation yielding heavy viable 
trajectories, providing a model of how the market may govern the evolution of 
prices. These results were obtained in collaboration with Halina Frankowska. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to illustrate the concept of heavy viable trajectories 
of a controlled system with feedbacks - studied in Aubin-Frankowska [ I 9 8 4  ] - in 
the framework of an economic model of resource allocation. 
Economic systems, as well as ecological and biological ones, are consuming scarce 
resources and face many constraints. 
Therefore, the state of such systems must evolve in a viability domain defined by 
these sacrcity constraints as well as the other constraints. Trajectories lying 
in the viability domain are called viable. - For instance, if we have to allocate 
a set of available commodities among consumers, the viability domain is the set 
of allocations, i.e., consumptions of consumers the sum of which are available. 
Now, assume that the dynamics governing the evolution of the state are controlled. 
For instance, in economics, prices can be regarded as such regulating controls, 
giving consumers an information about the market that they use in a decentralized 
way to change their consumptions knowing only the state of their own consumptions. 
(They don't need to know neither the choices of the other consumers nor the set 
of available resources). Viability theoryprovides necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence of at least one viable trajectory starting from 
any viable initial state. It above all provides the feedback laws (concealed in 
both the dynamics and the viability domain) which relate the regulating controls 
-the prices- to the states of the controlled system of differential equations- the 
allocationsofscarce resources among consumers. These feedback laws are not 
necessarily single-valued - deterministic -. They are most often set-valued maps, 
associating with each allocation a set of prices. We observe that the larger 
these subsets of prices are, the more flexible - and thus, the more robust - the 
regulation of the system will be, by allowing "mistakes" to be done. If we 
accept this mathematical metaphor of allocation of available commodities, we may 
propose that the duty of the market (Adam Smith's invisible hand) or of an 
adequate planning bureau should be to choose at each instant a price according 
to the feedback law. 
In this paper, we make the further assumption that prices evolve with a high 
inertia : the prices will change only when the viability of the system is at 
stake, and then, the slower the better. This is at least the case when the market 
sets prices : the metaphorical existence of the "market" as a decision-maker should 
at least assume that it is lazy. And one could say the same thing about a planning 
bureau ! This motivates the introduction of heavy viable trajectories, associating 
to an allocation a price such that at each instant, the norm of the velocity is 
minimal among all possible prices regulating this trajectory in a viable way. 
We shall provide the differential equations yielding heavy trajectories (which 
are also concealed in the dynamics and the viability domain) andstate some 
existence theorems. 
We observe that as long as the sum of the consumptions lies in the interior of 
the set of available commodities, any regulatory price will work. Therefore, 
along a heavy trajectory, the system maintain the price inherited from the past 
(the regulatory prices remains constant, even though the consumptions may evolve 
quite rapidly). 
When the sum of the consumptions reaches the boundary of the set of available 
resources, two situations may occur : 
(a) If the sum of the velocities "points inward" the set of available commodities, 
then we can still keep the same regulatory price, which pushes the sum of consump- 
tions into the set of commodities. 
(b) If not, the prices will start to evolve as slowly as possible in order to 
pushes the total consumption back into the commodity set. 
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Observe that other strategies are possible, such as "enlarging" the set of available 
commodities instead of acting on prices. But we are far to be able to tackle all 
phenomena at once . 
The differential equations which govern the evolution of heavy viable trajectories 
also reveal a division of the viability domain into "cells"; each cell is the 
subset of allocations which can be regulated by a constant price. 
We end this informal presentation of heavy viable trajectories by mentionning that 
paleontological concepts of biological evolution such as punctuated equilibria 
- 
proposed by Elredge and Gould are consistent with what we said. 
1 . Description of the decentralized allocation mechanism. 
We consider the decentralized dynamical allocation mechanism proposed in Aubin 
[ 1981 ] b) (see also Aubin-Cellina [ 1984 ] p. 245-256 and Stacchetti [ 1984 1 ) .  
We interpret Y := R' as a commodity space, its dual Y* as the price space. 
The description of the economy begins with 
( 1  1 )  the subset M C Y of available commodities 
The problem is to allocate commodities y E M  among n consumers i=l, ..., n ; 
each consumer chooses a commodity in its consumption set Li . 
The set K C yn of allocations of M is defined by 
* 
Let P C Y denote the set of feasible prices. 
We describe the behavior of each consumer by change functions c. : Li x P + Y . 
1 
The decentralized allocation mechanism is described by a system of n differential 
equations controlled by prices : For all x=(x , , x  ) E K , find T > 0 and 
0 0 1 0 n 
n absolutely continuous functions xi(=) satisfying, 
I i) for almost all t E [O,T ] , xf (t) = ci(xi(t),p(t)) 
r ii) for almost all t E [O,T ] , p(t) E P ( iii) x. (0) = xo 
1 i 
which are viable in the sense that 
V t E [O,T 1, V i=l,. . . ,n , xi(t) E Li and 1 xi(t) E M 
i= 1
We observe that this allocation mechanism is decentralized : the actions of each 
consumer depend only upon his consumption and the price. 
When K denotes a convex subset, we recall that the tangent cone TK(x) to K 
at x defined by 
is a closed convex cone. 
We assume that 
i )  the subsets L. and P are closed and convex 
1 
R ii) the subset M is closed and convex and M = M - R +  
and that 
1 ( i) the change functions c. are C around L. X P  
1 1 
(1.7) 1 ii) Y x E Li , Y p E P , c. (x,p) E TL (x) 1 i 
Assumptions(l.6) imply that 
(see Aubin-Ekeland [ 1984 1 p. 174). 
We then define the feedback map R from K to P by 
We observe that any viable trajectory of the decentralized allocation mechanism 
(1.3) is a solution to the feedback system : Y i=l, ..., n , 
I i) for almost all t E [O,T ] , xf(t) = ci(xi(t),p(t)) 
(1.10) ii) for almost all t E [O,T ] , p(t) E R(x(t)) 
[ iii) x. (0) = x. 
1 1 
0 
(see Aubin [I981 ] b) or Aubin-Cellina [ 1984 1 ,  p. 254). The standard viability 
theorem (see Haddad [I981 1, Aubin-Cellina [I984 1, p. 239-240) provides sufficient 
conditions for the existence of viable trajectories. Under the assumptions of this 
theorem, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of viable trajec- 
tories for all x E K is that 
0 
One also shows that assumption ( 1 . 1 1 )  implies the existence of an equilibrium 
- - - 
(xI, ..., x ,p) , a solution to 
n 
Hence, in the framework of this model, at each instant t , the price p(t) must 
be chosen in the subset R(x(t)) : it evolves according to a set-valued feedback 
rule. 
Then the question arises whether the market - or a planning bureau - can select a 
price p(t) in R(x(t)) . 
We propose to answer this question by singling out heavy viable trajectory which 
seem to be present in the evolution of macrosystems arising in social and biolo- 
gical sciences (which motivated viability theory in the first place). They are 
trajectories which minimize at each time the norm of the velocity of the price. 
The first difficulty which arises is that a solution to (1.3) is only absolutely 
continuous, so that the associated price is only measurable. To use the derivative 
in the distribution sense does not help because the concept of heavy trajectory 
requires the existence of the velocity of the price at almost each time. However, 
a straightforward strategy consists in differentiating the feedback relation 
(I.lO)ii) to reveal a law relating the velocities of the prices and the consumptions. 
For that purpose, we need an adequate concept of derivative of a set-valued map. 
2 . Contingent derivative of a set-valued map. 
When K is a subset of a finite-dimensional space X , we can define many concepts 
of "tangent cones", among which we mention 
a) the contingent cone TK(x) , defined by 
dK (x+hv) 
T~(x) := rv E X I lim inf h = 0) h -+ O+ 
b) the tangent cone (introduced by Clarke [I975 1) 
C) the Dubovickii-Miljutin [ 1963 ] cone 
We have the following relations (see Cornet [I981 1, Penot [ 1981 1 ,  Aubin-Ekeland 
[ 1984 1 p. 409) 
i) CK(x) = lim inf TK(y) C TK(x) 
Y + x  
Y E K  
ii) Int CK(x) C DK(x) C Int TK(x) 
The tangent cone is always convex. It coincides with the contingent cone when K 
is a smooth manifold (tangent space) or when K is convex or, more generally, 
when K is soft in the sense that 
(2.5) x + TK(x) is lower semicontinuous . 
Consider now a set-valued map R from X to Y and a point (x,y) of its 
graph. The contingent derivative DR(x,y) is the set-valued map from X to Y 
defined by 
(2.6) w E DR(x,y)(v) * (v,w) E T Graph (R) (x,Y) 
It is equivalent to say that 
(2.7) lim inf d Iw , R(x+~v')-Y = 
h + 0+ h 
v'+ v 
1 
The contingent derivative DR(x,y) is a closed process (a map whose graph is 
a closed cone). We say that the map R is soft if its graph is soft. Then 
DR(x,y) is a closed convex process, because its graph is equal to the tangent 
cone to Graph(R) at (x,y). 
We shall say that R is lower semicontinuously differentiable if 
- 
(2.8) (x,y,v) + DR(x,y)(v) is lower semicontinuous 
We observe that in this case DR(x,y) is a closed convex process because 
property (2.8) implies that (x,y) + TGraph(R) (x,y) is lower semicontinuous, 
and thus, Graph DR(x,y) is a closed convex cone. 
Finally, when K is a closed subset of X , we denote by 
(2.9) m(K) := u E K  I llul = ein Y~II) = nK(0) { v E K  
the subset of elements of K with minimal norm. If F is a continuous set-valued 
map with closed convex images, then m(F(x)) is reduced to a point and 
the single-valued map x + m(F(x)) is continuous. This is no longer the case when 
F is only upper or lower semicontinuous (with closed convex images). However, 
if F is lower semicontinuous with closed images, 
(2.10) 
then x -+ d(O,F(x)) is upper semicontinuous. 
We refer to Aubin [ 1983 ] and Aubin-Ekeland, [ 1984 ] , Chapter 7, Clarke 1 1983 ] 
for a general presentation of nonsmooth analysis relevant to this study. 
3 . Heavv viable traiectories. 
Let us consider the decentralized allocation mechanism (1.3), (1.4). We have seen 
that viable trajectories are solutions to the system (1.10). When the functions 
xi(-) and p(*) are absolutely continuous, we deduce from the "first-order" 
relation (1.10) ii) the "second-order" relation 
for almost all t E [O,T ] , 
(3.1) 
p'(t) E DR(x(t) ,p(t)) (c(x(t) ,p(t)) 
where we set 
Hence we can propose a rigorous definition. 
Definition 3.1 
We shall say that xl(), ...,xn() , p ) )  is a heavy viable trajectory of the 
allocation mechanism (1.3), (1.4) if it is a solution to the system of differential 
inclusions 
1 ii) p' E m(DR(x,p)) (c(x,p))) 
(iii) (x(O),p(O)) = (xOIpO) where x o E K  Po ER(xo) 
which is viable in the sense that 
Remark. Viability cells. 
The inverse of the feedback map R associates with any price p E P the subset 
R-I (p) of allocations which can be regulated by p . The viability cells C(p) 
are the subsets (possibly empty) of R-I (p) defined by 
Starting with an allocation x in a cell c(po) in the direction c. (x 
0 1 0. ,PO) , 
1 
a heavy viable trajectory keeps the constant price Po as long as the allocation 
x(t) remains in the state cell Ci(po) , because in this case the system (3.3) 
can be written 
The price system will start to evolve when the allocation leaves the viability cell 
C(po) . 
The study of the viability problem (3.3), (3.4) runs into the same difficulties 
that viability problems for second-order differential inclusions encounter . 
Therefore, we shall use the method proposed by Cornet-Haddad [I983 ] to overcome 
these difficulties. We are ready to state our main theorem. 
Theorem 3.2 
We posit assumptions (1.6) and (1.7) the "transversality" condition 
1 V (y,z) E Y x Y , 3 n E Tp(p) , 3 v. E T (xi) such that 
1 L: 
and the regularity assumption 
(3.8) the map x E M + TH(x) is soft 
Then the contingent derivative DR(x,P)(v) of the feedback map R is the closed 
n 
convex process from Il TL (xi) to Tp(~) defined by 
i=l i 
Furthermore, let us assume that 
the graphs of the set-valued maps I.(*) and Tp(-) 
(3.10) 1 
I are locally compact 
and that 
(3.11) the feedback map R is lower semicontinuously differentiable 
If both the first order condition 
and the second order condition 
(3.13) f (x,p) E Graph(R) , c(x,p) belongs to the domain of DR(x,~) 
hold true, then for all initial allocation x o E K and all initial price Po 
satisfying either 
:;3.14) po E R(xo) if Graph(TM(*)) is locally comoact 
0 I- 
n n 
(3.15) if not , 
i= 1 I= 1 
there exist T > 0 and a heavy viable trajectory of the decentralized allocation 
mechanism. 
A 
Remark 
For checking assumption (3.15), we can assume that the set-valued map 
TM is 
lower semicontinuously differentiable and use standard theorems implying that the 
intersection of lower semicontinuous maps is lower semicontinuous (see Aubin- 
Cellina [1984] p. 49, for instance). 
4 . Example. 
We cannot have an explicit analytical expression of m(DR(x,p) (c(x,p))) except in 
special situations. We assume, for instance, that we don't take into account the 
constraints on prices and consumptions of individual consumers : we take P = Y* 
and Li = Y for all i=l, ..., n . Then, for all x E K , 
n 
(4.1) ~ ( x )  = {p EY* I 1 ci(xi,p) E T ~  
i= 1 [ i= ; I ~i]} 
The surjectivi ty property 
n a 
V (x,~) E Graph(R) , 1 ci(xi,p) is surjective 
i= l 
implies that the transversality property (3.7) is satisfied. Hence, if we assume 
that TM is soft, we can write 
Let us set now 
We assume that the second order condition 
h o l d s  t r u e .  By s e t t i n g  
t h e  e lement  o f  minimal norm o f  D R ( x , p ) ( c ( x , p ) )  can be w r i t t e n  
when IT d e n o t e s  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  o f  b e s t  approx imat ion  o n t o  t h e  c l o s e d  convex 
V(x,p> 
s u b s e t  V(x,p) . 
The c a s e  o f  a n  exchange economy. 
I n  o r d e r  t o  proceed w i t h  a n a l y t i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  we make t h e  f u r t h e r  assumpt ions  
(4 .7 )  M = 2 w - W+ 
and 
(4 .8)  1 c i ( x i , p )  := y i ( x i )  - - n P  
When y i ( x )  = ~ f ( x )  i s  t h e  g r a d i e n t  of  a  concave d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  
t h e n  t h e  s u p e r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  o f  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  of U i  t o  a  budge t  s e t  
x  1 p ,  r i s  y i ( x )  - p  B+ . Change f u n c t i o n s  of  t h e  form (4 .8)  a r e  
s t e e p e s t  a s c e n t  d i r e c t i o n s  o f  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  budget  s e t s .  
We o b s e r v e  t h a t  
DTM(y , u )  (v) = 
(4 .9)  
{W E Y I wh < 0  whenever - yn - wh and uh = vh = 0 )  
and t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  TM i s  lower  semicon t inuous ly  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e .  
We s e t  
and 
They associate to each allocation x and price p the subsets of commodity labels 
for which the first and second order conditions are satisfied respectively. Indeed 
n 
(4.11) 
= {p ER I p n >  1 yi(xi)h for all h EHl(x) 
i= 1 
and 
a. n 1 
n ER / nh 2 1 (y:(xi) (yi(xi)- ; P))~ for all h E ~ ~ ( x , p )  
i= 1 1 
Therefore 
The system of differential equations governing the evolution of heavy viable 
allocations of w are 
and 
This differential equation can be interpreted as a metaphor of Adam Smith's 
invisible hand letting the prices evolve in this simple exchange economy. For a 
given commodity h , the price will remain constant when the total consumption 
n n n 
1 x. is less than the supply wh or when 1 xi = w , but 1 < 
h i=l h h i= 1 i= 1 
<ph (yielding a decrease in consumption of the commodity h ) .  The price pn 
n n 
starts to evolve with minimum speed when both 1 xi = w and 1 yi(x.) = p 
i=l h h i= 1 l h  h '  
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